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ABSTRACT: The temporal loop of Proust’s Recherche complicates
the unidirectional understanding of anamnesis in psychoanalysis,
which, in turn, allows for a renewed reading of the temporality
of the Recherche, highlighting the intrinsic link between artistic
‘research’ and unconscious affect— at the same time origin, motif,
and destination.
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Two meanings of the prefix ‘re-’ coexist in the title À la re-
cherche du temps perdu.1 The Recherche unfolds at the same
time backward in an iterative movement and forward in
an intensive gesture. The (perhaps too) schematic outline
of two general directional trends reveals that depending
on which pole of the axis of chronological time is being
given precedence, the Recherche can be accounted for as
memory or as apprenticeship, as the narrative of a des-
tiny determined by the workings of the unconscious or as
a movement teleologically oriented toward the final reve-
lation of a pure time of essences. Yet the double syllepsis
that shapes the title suggests that the poles of such alterna-
tives, however exclusive their directionalities might seem,
would have to be thought jointly. I propose to interrogate
anew this seeming incompossibility by way of a linguistic
1 See Gaillard, ‘Recherche I’, in this volume.
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subterfuge: reframing the enquiry of ‘re-’ by way of its
Greek counterpart ‘ana-’, I will complicate our recherche
on the temporality of the Recherche (of any recherche?) by
confronting it to anamnesis — and more specifically to
Jean-François Lyotard’s elaboration of this notion.
‘Anamnesis’ is the key operator that allows Lyotard to
draw an analogy between the ways in which literature and
psychoanalysis, respectively, relate to time, and to define
both as a recherche du temps perdu — as a search for lost
time.2 Even though Lyotard never devoted a full length
essay to Proust’s novel, the question of temps perdu and
the strange modalities of its recherche haunt the philo-
sopher’s writings after his 1983 monographThe Differend.
Indeed, they resurface systematically each time that Lyo-
tard attempts to compare the work of psychoanalysis and
the work of art (and ultimately that of philosophy) with
respect to the question of the immemorial. But assimi-
lating Proust’s Recherche to the movement of anamnesis
(literally: the action of recalling past events) by no means
amounts to accrediting a determinist hypothesis accord-
ing to which the directionality of the Recherche would be
entirely geared towards a ‘remembrance of things past’.
On the contrary: to Lyotard, ‘things past are remembered
ahead’ (Le temps perdu se recherche en avant).3 ‘Ahead’, or
forward: this direction does not merely describe a linear
progression of the act of searching. As we shall see, this
‘search ahead’ rather characterizes an unsettling of sequen-
2 See Anne Tomiche, ‘Anamnesis’, in Traversals of Affect: On Jean-
François Lyotard, ed. by Julie Gaillard, Claire Nouvet, and Mark Sto-
holski (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), pp. 73–88 (pp. 82–84).
3 Jean-François Lyotard, ‘Domus and the Megalopolis’, inThe Inhuman:
Reflections on Time, transl. by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby
(Cambridge: Polity, 1991), pp. 191–204 (p. 198); ‘Domus et la méga-
pole’, in L’Inhumain. Causeries sur le temps (Paris: Klincksiesck, 2014),
pp. 181–92 (p. 187).
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tial time, in which the past is not recalled but actually
occurs at the end of a search that it nonetheless drives
forward from the beginning. By conflating ‘recherche’ and
‘anamnesis’, Lyotard complicates the chronology that ori-
ents time in a linear succession of causes and effects from
an origin to an end.
My aim is to highlight the consequences that Lyotard’s
assimilation of psychoanalysis and literature as recherche
du temps perdu have in both fields: on the one hand, the
temporal structure of the Recherche complicates a simple
understanding of anamnesis as remembering or tracing
back, which Lyotard challenges in order to propose a rad-
ical view of the unconscious, absolutely devoid of any
representational character. On the other hand, Lyotard’s
conceptualization of the mechanisms of the après-coup al-
lows for a renewed reading of Proust that seems to syn-
thesize the two opposing trends — deterministic versus
teleological — sketched out in my other contribution to
this volume.
As Anne Tomiche has pointed out, ‘[Lyotard’s] use
of the term “anamnesis” does not refer to Plato’s epis-
temological and psychological theory of knowledge’, but
is elaborated in dialogue with Freudian psychoanalysis.4
Lyotard associates anamnesis with the Freudian Durch-
arbeitung (working-through), most famously defined in
contradistinction to othermodes of recollection in Freud’s
1914 essay on psychoanalytic technique titled ‘Erinnern,
Wiederholen und Durcharbeiten (Remembering, Repeating
and Working-Through)’.5 While something ‘simply’ for-
4 Tomiche, ‘Anamnesis’, p. 75 and p. 82.
5 Sigmund Freud, Gesammelte Werke, 17 vols (London: Imago, 1940–
52), x: Werke aus den Jahren 1913–1917 (1946), pp. 125–36; The
Standard Edition of the Complete PsychologicalWorks of Sigmund Freud,
ed. and trans. by James Strachey, 24 vols (London:Hogarth, 1953–74),
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gotten can be remembered, repressed ‘impressions, scenes
or experiences’6 usually do not resurface as amemory, but,
unbeknownst to the analysand, as an acting out in their
life or in the transferential relation to the analyst. Acting-
out, another name for repetition, therefore constitutes a
form of resistance to remembering: stuck in the loop of
reiteration, the analysand does not know what they re-
peat. The analytic technique, relying on free association
and transference, implies a working-through of the pa-
tient’s resistances, including screen memories and primal
scenes, which do not ‘hide’ other memories but indicate
the existence of repressed phantasies andmnesic traces left
by impressions that have never reached consciousness.7
Recollection, remembrance, (secondary) repression, re-
surfacing, repetition, resistance: all these modalities of
memory imply the reiteration, indeed, the ceaseless retell-
ing of a psyche to safeguard the linearity of causal tempor-
ality.
Lyotard’s originality with respect to the Freudian
Durcharbeitung concerns most clearly its temporal
dimension.8 Indeed, in order to elaborate anamnesis as a
pivotal operator, Lyotard combines the working-through
of the paper on analytic technique with the temporal
structure of afterwardsness (or Nachträglichkeit; in
French: après-coup) and its corollary of primal repression
that Freud first described in the early Project for a Scientific
xii:TheCase of Schreber, Papers on Technique and OtherWorks (1958),
pp. 145–56. AnneTomiche notes that ‘the term […]does not belong to
Freud’s main lexicon’, but becomes an important operator in Lyotard’s
works (‘Anamnesis’, p. 76).
6 Freud, ibid., p. 148.
7 Ibid., pp. 148–49. For a comparison of the descriptions of screen
memories in Proust and Freud, see in particular Jean-Yves Tadié,Le Lac
inconnu. Entre Proust et Freud (Paris: Gallimard, 2012), pp. 79–85.
8 See Tomiche, Anamnesis, p. 82.
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Psychology. As will become clear, this combination
allows to think an unconscious that is not constituted
by repressed representations, but is completely non-
representational, and therefore radically escapes any
philosophy of consciousness.9 Anamnesis, understood
as the act of working through representations and scenes
towards the affect that knows no scene and escapes
any representation, becomes for Lyotard a privileged
modality of opening of a passage toward a ‘past’ that is
lost — neither forgotten nor repressed, but indeed never
inscribed in the first place.
As Lyotard demonstrates in Heidegger and ‘the
jews’, Nachträglichkeit implies ‘a double blow that is
constitutively asymmetrical’.10 A first event strikes the
psychic apparatus, but its intensity is too excessive to allow
the psychic apparatus to record it, let alone assimilate it.
Lyotard illustrates this mechanism through an analogy
with a whistle too high-pitched to be perceived by the
human ear.11 Not recorded, this first blow nonetheless
leaves an imperceptible trace, which is dubbed, after
Freud, ‘unconscious affect’ — although, as Lyotard notes,
it is not localizable ‘within’ the psyche.12 Lyotard imagines
this trace ‘to be like a cloud of energy particles that are
not subject to serial laws, that are not organized into sets
9 Claire Nouvet has analyzed this distinction in ‘For “Emma”’, in Tra-
versals of Affect, ed. by J. Gaillard, C. Nouvet, and M. Stoholski, pp.
37–54 (p. 39).
10 Jean-François Lyotard, Heidegger and ‘the jews’, transl. by Andreas
Michel and Mark S. Robert (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1990), p. 15. The pages on the mechanism of après-coup have
already been commented in J. Gaillard, ‘The Task of Thinking (in)
The Postmodern Space of “The Zone”’, in Traversals of Affect, ed. by
J. Gaillard, C. Nouvet, and M. Stoholski, pp. 229–46 (pp. 234–37).
11 Lyotard,Heidegger and ‘the jews’, p. 15.
12 See Nouvet, ‘For “Emma”’, p. 41.
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that can be thought in terms of words or images, that
do not experience any attraction at all’.13 Because it has
not been inscribed, the effect of the shock cannot be
repressed: it insists beyond any word or image, beyond
any representation, diffuse and inert. This is what Lyotard
identifies after Freud asUrverdrängung (primal repression)
— although it is not exactly ‘repressed’, for lack of prior
inscription. The first blow is therefore ‘a shock without
affect’.14 The second blow, conversely, is
an affect without shock: I buy something in a store,
anxiety crushes me, I flee, but nothing had really
happened. The energy dispersed in the affective
cloud condenses, gets organized, brings on an ac-
tion, commands a flight without a ‘real’ motive.
And it is this flight, the feeling that accompanies
it, which informs consciousness that there is some-
thing, without being able to tell what it is. It indi-
cates the quod but not the quid.15
The sudden surfacing of affect cannot be ascribed to any
apparent cause. According to the chronology of temporal-
izing consciousness, the affect that surfaces as the second
‘blow’ merely indicates that ‘there is’ something, without
providing any indication as to what that ‘thing’ may be.
This affect has no representation, no content but itself.
As such, the second shock is not properly caused by the
first blow, whose effects remained ‘outside the scene’ of
the psychic apparatus — outside of any representation,
conscious or unconscious. This implies a dismantling of
chronology. Indeed:
13 Lyotard,Heidegger and ‘the jews’, p. 15.
14 Ibid., p. 16.
15 Ibid.
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This ‘before’ of the quod is also an ‘after’ of the quid.
Forwhatever is nowhappening in the store (i.e., the
terror and the flight) does not come from [provient];
it comes back [revient] from the first blow, from the
shock, from the ‘initial’ excess that remained out-
side the scene, even unconscious, deposited out-
side representation. This is at least the Freudian
(and Proustian) hypothesis. We may call this the
chronologization, obtained by virtue of anamnesis,
the setting into diachrony of what takes places in
a time that is not diachronic, since what happened
earlier is given at a later date (in analysis, in writ-
ing), and since what is later in the symptom (the
secondblow)occurs ‘before’what happened earlier
(the first blow). This chronologization of a time
that is not chronological, this retrieval of a time (the
first blow) that is lost because it has not had place
and time in the psychic apparatus, that has not been
noticed there, fulfills exactly the presumed function
of a protective shield that Freud attributes to it in
Jenseits [Lyotard is here referring to Freud’s Beyond
the Pleasure Principle, J.G.]. Narrative organization
is constitutive of diachronic time, and the time that
it constitutes has the effect of ‘neutralizing’ an ‘ini-
tial’ violence, of representing a presence without
representation, of staging the obscene, of disasso-
ciating the past from the present, and of staging a
recollection that must be a reappropriation of the
improper, achronological affect.16
Affect occurs ‘before’ the ‘initial’ shock which has ‘caused’
it: never registered by consciousness, detached from its lo-
gical origin, the unconscious affect knows no causality and
obeys no chronology. As Claire Nouvet writes, ‘it presents
itself over and over again, without ever representing itself,
each time as if for the first time.’17 Its achronic tempor-
ality undoes diachrony, interrupts it. Anamnesis thus can
16 Ibid., translation modified.
17 Nouvet, ‘For “Emma”’, p. 43.
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be defined as the attempt to account for this unsettling
achrony within a narrative organization that will establish
the link between the first and the second blow, articulate
the order of causes and effects within a chronological se-
quence of past, present, and future.Theunconscious affect,
amonstrosity for consciousness, is thereby forgotten in the
very moment when it is ‘treated’, bound by the linear tem-
porality of causal explanation. Always belated with respect
to the apparition of the affect that seizes it, consciousness
must reintegrate it into the causal diachrony of a sequence
of scenes.18
In Lyotard’s works, ‘Proust’ and his Recherche become
the passwords summarizing the workings of this aberrant
temporality, and this necessity for consciousness of ‘ex-
plaining’ the affect by integrating it within a causal se-
quence, by narrating it.Their mention is always parenthet-
ical, appositional, analogical— as if they were transparent
synonyms for ‘anamnesis’. According to the temporality
of afterwardsness, the affect without a cause befalls the
subject ‘before’ any ‘reason’ that could have caused it in
the first place can be even searched for — since whatever
event caused this affect has never been registered. Which
is why the directionality of the search, of the Recherche,
proceeds at the same time backward and forward (in the
chronological time of conscious succession): my recherche,
my anamnesis, is initiated by an affect whose cause actu-
ally lies ahead of me, since it is reconstructed après-coup.
Trying to understand it, attempting to locate its source, I
will always be out of step with it. I contend that this mech-
18 See also Tomiche, ‘Anamnesis’, p. 82 and Nouvet, ‘For “Emma”’, p. 42,
as well as ‘The Inarticulate Affect: Lyotard and Psychoanalytic Testi-
mony’, in Minima Memoria: In the Wake of Jean-François Lyotard, ed.
by Claire Nouvet, Kent Still, and Zrinka Stahuljak (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2007), pp. 106–22 (pp. 120–21).
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anism, at stake in Lyotard’s statement that ‘things past are
remembered ahead’ (le temps perdu se recherche en avant),
is also exactly what Proust describes in scenes such as the
famous one of the Madeleine:
Whence could it have come tome, this all-powerful
joy? I sensed that it was connected with the taste of
the tea and the cake, but that it infinitely transcen-
ded those savours, could not, indeed, be of the same
nature.Where did it come from?What did itmean?
How could I seize and apprehend it? […] I put
down the cup and examine my own mind. It alone
can discover the truth. But how? What an abyss of
uncertainty, whenever the mind feels overtaken by
itself; when it, the seeker, is at the same time the
dark region through which it must go seeking and
where all its equipment will avail it nothing. Seek?
More than that: create. It is face to face with some-
thing which does not yet exist, which it alone can
make actual, which it alone can bring into the light
of day.19
‘Seek? [chercher?] More than that: create.’ Proust writes it
in so many words: explaining the sudden occurrence of
an affect that befalls the subject ‘without the notion of its
cause’ is not only a search backward to retrieve an origin: it
is a search forward to produce it. And forProust, as for Lyo-
tard, the same goes for artistic creation in general, and for
the structure of À la recherche du temps perdu in particular.
As AnneTomiche summarizes: ‘Proust’s cycle functions as
a paradigm for the literaryworkof anamnesis because, Lyo-
tard explains, the Recherche, which is entirely structured as
a search for lost time, ends but only to open, at the end,
19 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 6 vols, trans. by C. K. Scott
Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin, rev. by D. J. Enright (New York:
Modern Library, 1992), i: Swann’s Way, p. 61.
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onto the time when the writing of the Recherche begins.’20
Affect does not demand to be reintegrated into the dia-
chrony of causes: but consciousness seeks to integrate it
nonetheless, creating scenes and links between scenes to
account for it — thereby bound to miss it over and over
again. Which is why anamnesis is interminable, and why
the Recherche, as Lyotard writes, ‘ends on an acknowledge-
ment of a debt [une reconnaissance de dette]’, in spite of
the immense effort of Proust’s writing.21 The ‘lost time’
that affect is remains ‘lost’ for consciousness, ‘lost’ for rep-
resentation, and nonetheless keeps re-presenting itself in
making itself be felt, obliquely, through the lure of scenes
that are always questioned as such.22
But if the aim of anamnesis is to work through the
resistance of matter, of representations, of ‘scenes’, in order
to ‘regain’, as it were, or at least approach this ‘essence of
time lost’, then it no longer has much to do with memory.
What would be a memory of something that has never
known any inscription? What does it mean to search back
towards something that has never taken place?
With Proust, to create is to bear witness to the fact that
‘some-thing’ has been forgotten that escapes any retrieval
because it escapes empirical diachrony. One could easily
demonstrate throughout all aspects of theRecherche the in-
20 Tomiche, ‘Anamnesis’, p. 83.
21 Jean-François Lyotard, ‘La Peinture, anamnèse du visible’, inMisère de
la philosophie (Paris: Galilée, 2000), pp. 97–115 (p. 104), my transla-
tion.
22 Tomiche, ‘Anamnesis’, p. 83: ‘all memories and all representations are
questioned as possible deceptions […] Freud and Proust meet in this
remembrance of things past which is the task of art— and if anamnesis
is a search for lost time, it is not insofar as the time lost would be
represented, or even presented, but insofar as art ensures a passage
towards the essence of time lost, a “pure affect”, the “pure event” of
a “it happens”.’
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sistence of such a motif and its effects in style, as creation
opens a passage toward the immemorial affect through the
matter of words and sounds. The narrator of The Captive,
to quote only one instance, notes that the unique accent
of Vinteuil’s music is proof of the irreducibly singular ex-
istence of the soul, and asks: ‘That Song, … where did
Vinteuil learn it, hear it? Each artist seems like the citi-
zen of an unknown fatherland, forgotten to themselves
(une patrie inconnue, oubliée de lui-même)’.23 To create is
to remember the immemorial. Writing, as anamnesis, as
recherche, is always belated, and always treasonous: it is
bound to betray the pure occurrence of the affect that set
it in motion. However, only this recherche can bear witness
to the factuality of that temps perdu.
With the framing of ‘time lost’ according to primal re-
pression, a psychoanalytic reading of the Recherche meets
the question of the immemorial. It thus reaches the ques-
tion left in suspense previously: that of the possible rec-
onciliation of the immemorial time of the unconscious
and the immemorial time of essences. As I have begun to
show in my other contribution to this volume, Kristeva
seems to hesitate when it comes to identifying the nature
of the Schopenhauerian ‘Being’ she discerns at the core of
the temporality of the Recherche. On the one hand, Being
would be the unconscious, but she also ventures to hypo-
thesize, beyond the unconscious, an inordinate attempt to
escape any subjectivity and reach some state prior to the
formation of the psychic apparatus [‘s’évader du subjectif
23 Marcel Proust, À la recherche du temps perdu, 7 vols, ed. by Jean-
Yves Tadié and others (Paris: Gallimard, 1988–90), v: La prisonnière
(1989), p. 245, my translation. By positing that the singularity of an
artist lies in a forgotten ‘fatherland’ inside the subject unbeknownst
to them, Proust seems to describe an immemorial that is not abstract
and/or collective but indeed singular.
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pour atteindre le prépsychique’].24 Lyotard’s combination of
the Freudian motifs of Durcharbeitung and Nachträglich-
keit accounts for two kinds of unconscious: one formed
by repressed representations, and the other void of any
representional character. Can’t we see, in this ‘beyond’ of
the representational unconscious, some kinship with the
unconscious affect that Lyotard associates with primal re-
pression?
We saw that, on the other hand, Deleuze does away
with the hypothesis of a directionality determined by the
workings of the unconscious and considers the revelation
of the pure, absolute, immemorial time of essences to be
the consecration of an apprenticeship that will ultimately
reveal that the immemorial was there from the beginning,
enmeshed in all other temporalities that it sustainswithout
hardly ever letting itself be felt, outside of reminiscences
and of the signs of art. Yet Lyotard contends that Deleuze
and psychoanalysis can be reconciled. InHeidegger and ‘the
jews’, having formulated the Freudian hypothesis of an un-
conscious devoid of representational formations, Lyotard
explicitly builds on Deleuze’s reading of Proust as he is
about to introduce the specificity ofNachträglichkeit:
[Deleuze] discovers inÀ la recherche du temps perdu
the sort of past that interests us here, a past be-
yond [en deçà] of the forgotten, much closer to the
presentmoment [l’actuel] than anypast, at the same
time that it is incapable of being solicited by volun-
tary and conscious memory— a past Deleuze says
that is not past but always there.
24 Julia Kristeva, ‘Entretien: La Transsubstanciation de Proust: une sus-
pension du refoulement’, in Marcel Proust, visiteur des psychanalystes,
ed. by Andrée Bauduin and Françoise Coblenc (Paris: PUF, 2003), pp.
63–95 (p. 68).
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Whatever Deleuze might think of this, there is
in Freud’s own approach and tone a way of articu-
lating this paradox of the immemorial.25
And elsewhere he states: ‘The “signs” that Deleuze, in his
Proust, comments on so well are these affects, outside of
diachrony. Signs that are signed by the “reason” of the
associative fabric, the thing, that writing at the same time
marks and misses.’26 The ‘signs’ signal towards the quod
without quid of affect, of the immemorial, of the Lacanian
‘thing (chose)’, that insists ‘unbeknownst’, the trace of its
present absence in representation.
Thehypothesis of recherche as anamnesis, i.e. as awork-
ing through the scenes of secondary repression towards
an affect without representation given by primal repres-
sion, which insists under representation, time lost under
the present, brings together the determinist hypothesis of
the unconscious and the teleological hypothesis of the im-
memorial. The Recherche is not oriented towards its origin
or its end in a linear fashion, rather it spreads out into
the illogical space where beginning and end correspond,
where the end motivates, creates the beginning. Time lost
is not a time accessible to experience yet its effects are felt
concretely: it is what motivates the perpetual search, con-
stantly torn between the two poles of an end, that is an
origin, and of an origin, that comes at the end.
25 Lyotard,Heidegger and ‘the jews’, p. 12, translation modified.
26 Lyotard, ‘La Peinture, anamnèse du visible’, p. 103, my translation; cf.
‘Les “signes” que Deleuze, dans son Proust, commente si bien, sont
ces affects, hors diachronie. Des signes que signe la “raison” du tissu
associatif, la chose, que l’écriture à la fois marque et manque.’
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